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Simply Unbelievable: Reasonable Women and
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Sarah A. DeCosse*
Before the eyes of a nation, a tenured law professor beloved by
her students was transformed into an evil, opportunistic harpy;
a deeply religious Baptist was turned into a sick and delusional
woman possessed by Satan and in need of exorcism; this
youngest of 13 children from a loving family became a frus-
trated spinster longing for the attentions of her fast-track su-
perior, bent on exacting a cruel revenge for his rejection.
These skillful transformations of Anita Hill's character
by some members of the Senate were effective because they
were familiar, manageable images of African-American wo-
manhood.... In their extremity, these are images far more ac-
cessible and understandable than the polished and gracious
dignity, the cool intelligence that Anita Hill displayed in the
lion's den of the Senate chamber. However she found herself
reconstituted, the result was the same. She was, on all levels,
simply unbelievable.
* * * As credible, as inspiring, as impressive as she was,
most people who saw her had no context in which to judge
her.... Quite simply, a woman like Anita Hill couldn't possi-
bly exist. And in that sense, she is in fine historical company.1
If Anita Hill were to bring a hostile environment sexual har-
assment claim in the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth
Circuit today, she would be evaluated according to the "reasonable
woman" standard relied on in the Ellison v. Brady decision.2
Although the standard suggests movement beyond the constricting
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images which were used to discredit Hill, it also reduces the wo-
man complainant's legitimacy to concordance with a limited notion
of "reasonableness."3 Yet, in the face of persistent challenges to
women's credibility in the American legal system, Ellison's "rea-
sonable woman" standard may serve as the first step towards a
legal standard in hostile environment sexual harassment claims
which better reflects women's varied experiences and offers them
genuine protection of the law.4
In sexual harassment claims, women have been disregarded,
silenced, or presumed incredible in their response to conduct
which males have long perceived, or at least excused, as innocu-
ous.5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' adoption of a "reason-
able woman" standard represents a clear shift in the law of hostile
environment sexual harassment by a respected court. A careful
examination of the basis underlying the Ellison "reasonable wo-
man" standard reveals that although the symbolic adoption of a
woman's perspective is valuable, the court failed to fully flesh out
the "reasonable woman." To adequately interpret a woman's ex-
perience, courts must recognize the fundamental inequities at play
in a situation of sexual harassment, and how a multitude of fac-
tors, including the woman's race, class and sexual orientation, im-
pact her experience.6 The true incorporation of the breadth and
diversity of women's experiences may eventually push courts be-
yond assertions of universal principles that claim neutrality, such
as reasonableness. 7
3. Id.
4. Recent surveys of the legal profession demonstrate that "a woman's sex
places her at a disadvantage as a litigant, party in domestic conflicts, practicing at-
torney, and even as an employee of the court." See Gail Diane Cox, Reports Track
Discrimination: Fourteen Volumes Chronicle how Women are Treated in Court,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 1.
5. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991).
6. Cf. Lucinda F. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 907-08
(1989). Finley commented,
[T]he feminist project of incorporating "women's experience" into
legal definitions is not as simple as "one, figure out who or what is
'women'; two, consult women's experience; and three, add it to law
and stir." Women's experiences are diverse and often contradictory
.... Legal activists... can embrace the fact that women have many
very different experiences and can start working into the law the
questions raised by women's challenges to the prevailing legal con-
structions of situations.
IdL
7. See id. at 910. Finley concluded that:
Because legal reasoning can be sensitive to context, we can work to ex-
pand the context that it deems relevant. By pulling the contextual
threads of legal language, we can work towards making law more coin-
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I. Women's Credibility Gap in the Legal Field
For courts to incorporate the diversity of women's exper-
iences into the decision-making process, they must first listen to
what women witnesses have to say. Unfortunately, recent studies
have shown that women suffer from a wide credibility gap in the
legal field. One study concluded that "women, be they attorneys,
witnesses or otherwise, generally were perceived as having less
credibility than men."8 In another study, more than half the
judges and almost three-quarters of the lawyers polled remarked
that they perceived gender discrimination to exist towards liti-
gants, witnesses and attorneys in the state courts. 9 Responding to
the succession of highly publicized challenges to women's credibil-
ity, one columnist suggested that "somewhere, from the depths of
mythology about women, the suspicion always arises that women
are just not reliable."10
Continuing research unveils the biases which shape the law,
including supposedly universal, neutral standards and principles
which merely institutionalize the experiences of elite white
males." Although hostile environment sexual harassment case
law has, in general, recognized an inequity, it has failed to fully ex-
plore that inequity and formulate a sufficient response. Efforts to
fortable with diversity and complexity, less wedded to the felt need for
universalizing, reductive principles.
Id.
8. How Gender Bias Creeps into Courts; Judicial Council Proposals are Bril-
liantly to the Point, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1990, at B6.
9. Gender Bias in State Courts, Says Task Force Report, PR NEWSWIRE, Olym-
pia, Wash., Aug. 25, 1989.
10. Caryl Rivers, Is There No Believable Woman to Accuse a Powerful Man?,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1991, at A29. Rivers pointed to how the varied demeanor and
behavior of Anita Hill and the woman who charged William Kennedy Smith with
rape resulted in both being stereotypically "branded." "The fact is, we do not be-
lieve women who seem to have no apparent motive for lying and not much to gain,
either. But we do believe powerful men even though they have a lot to gain from
not telling the truth." Id. Clearly, men, and not women, gain from perpetuating
these stereotypes.
Is it more logical to think Anita Hill invented the stuff about porno
talk because she is a nutty scorned woman, or that Clarence Thomas-
who was known to be a viewer of such films-in fact borrowed some
language from flicks he watched?... Fantasies about women breed in
the shadows, and it's only when they are exposed that they can be
seen as the bizarre, twisted creatures that they are.
Id.
11. See Angela P. Harris, Race an Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (1990). Harris views the Preamble to the Constitution
("We the People...") as the first historical instance of one voice claiming to speak
in universal terms for a group, where in fact the views expressed were not truly
shared by anyone other than those empowered to write them. She explains that
the power of this voice lasts only as long as the other voices remain silenced. Id.
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reform the American legal system to respond to challenges to wo-
men's credibility in other legal areas are instructive. The best
known corrective measures are rape-shield laws, designed to ex-
clude irrelevant testimony about the sexual history of a sexual as-
sault victim.12 In other legal areas, bias against women is only
slowly being unearthed.'3
The profusion of stereotypes about women who bring charges
of rape caused reform of rape laws, with measures such as rape
shield statutes. A Manhattan district attorney in the Sex-Crimes
Unit remarked of a victim's testimony in a rape case, "It's almost
like a product .... You're selling the credibility of this woman."'14
Rape cases often require the victim not only to prove her case
against the defendant, but also to demonstrate her own credibil-
ity.15 This burden placed upon victims of rape to demonstrate
their credibility does not exist for victims of other crimes, whose
sincerity is rarely challenged.16
The most notable myth about a woman bringing a rape
charge is that her sexual history bears on her credibility. Thus, if
a rape victim is a prostitute, she is perceived as an especially unre-
liable witness. 17 Yet, if the woman has or had some type of affec-
12. Lori Heise, When Women are Prey; Around the World Rape is Common-
place-and the Victims Can't Fight Back, WASH. PosT, Dec. 8, 1991, at C1. Heise
describeA the adoption of rape-shield laws by all 50 states as an answer to "the ten-
dency for juries to discount testimony from sexually active women." Id. Yet, she
pointed to "subtle prejudice" in the U.S. legal system which continues to under-
mine women's credibility. Id.
13. See, e.g., Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right
to Die", 18:1-2 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
14. Peter Marks, He Cried Romance; She Cried Rape, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1991,
at 4. Attorneys added that a case became more difficult when the accused was a
good-looking, young, well-connected man and the charge was acquaintance rape.
Id.
15. Nicole Rosenberg Economou, Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1161-62 (1991)
(citations omitted). A prosecutor must:
wage war against a general feeling of distrust and distaste for rape vic-
tims. In addition, she must present her case to a jury that may enter-
tain various misconceptions about women and rape. Jurors tend to
believe, for example, that the victim was "asking for it," that she actu-
ally wanted to be raped, or that she was not raped at all. Implicit in
these beliefs is the assumption that the woman bringing formal crimi-
nal charges against the defendant is not to be believed.
Id.
16. Peter Marks & Michele Ingrassia, When the Rapist is Someone She Knows,
NEWSDAY, July 21, 1991, at 4. Describing challenges to credibility, prosecutor Susan
Onorato commented, "It's like the scarlet letter is 'R.' If you come into court with
it, you have to overcome it."
17. Just five years ago, a California Superior Court judge dismissed rape
charges against a defendant explaining that since the victim was a prostitute she
could not be the victim of rape. See Tracy Wilkinson, Victim for Alleged Rape May
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tional relationship with the rapist, her credibility also suffers.' 8
The believability of the woman witness is also undermined by ar-
guments that her appearance, her clothes, her age and even how
she applies make-up speak to her honesty.19 Women's reactions to
having been raped have also been used to challenge their truthful-
ness, often for failing to respond in expected ways.20 The develop-
ment of rape-shield laws now prevent the admission of irrelevant
sexual history of the victim. Expert testimony on the Rape
Trauma Syndrome should also improve the credibility problem of
women victims, particularly those who are discredited for having
responded "incorrectly" to having been raped.2 '
The law has also begun to recognize credibility problems of
women who bring charges of battery against their husbands or sig-
nificant others.
As in marital rape cases, women bringing these charges suf-
fer from traditional presumptions that they do not have a right to
such a claim.22 Although the courts no longer silence women on
this issue, neither do they treat these women as entirely reliable
witnesses. The fact that a woman neither leaves her husband or
significant other, nor reports an alleged beating, has been intro-
duced as evidence that no battery occurred. Yet, with the admis-
sion of expert testimony regarding Battered Women Syndrome,
which explains the typical behavior patterns in response to contin-
uing violence in the home, the perception of battered women as
credible witnesses has improved.23 Moreover, the fact that bat-
Have Fled Because of History as Prostitute, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1990, at B3. In an-
other case, four men charged with rape had been arrested when they were observed
by police holding a gun to a woman's head in a parked car. Id. Like many other
prostitutes who are the victims of violent crimes, the victim in this case did not ap-
pear to testify against the defendants. Id.
18. See Marks & Ingrassia, NEWSDAY, supra note 16, at 4. By virtue of their
present or past relationship with their assailant, victims of acquaintance rape and
more so, marital rape, must overcome a presumption that unless they explicitly,
even violently protest a sexual advance, they are perpetually sexually available.
See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
19. See Marks & Ingrassia, supra note 16, at 4. See also, Karla Fischer, Defin-
ing the Boundaries of Admissable Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 700 n.59 (1989) (citing to State v. Stafford, 346
S.E.2d 463, 464 (N.C. 1986) in which the judge referred to the 13 year-old victim of
rape as a "junior high school student . . . 125 pounds, and well developed for her
age.").
20. Economou, supra note 15.
21. See id.
22. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 149, 153 (Spring 1978).
23. See Sarah Crippen Madison, A Critique and Proposed Solution to the Ad-
verse Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in
19921
Law and Inequality
tered women do speak out in the face of a society that may blame
them for their batterer's actions should add to their credibility.24
From the initial call for police assistance to the courtroom, how-
ever, the battered woman still faces the possibility that she simply
will not be believed.
Still, by and large, women continue to suffer from the credi-
bility gap. Women who participate in the making of violent por-
nography also fall into the credibility gap. Despite the fact that
many of these women are involved in the business only because of
blackmail and threats,25 if they make an assault or rape charge,
they are nonetheless perceived as unreliable witnesses.26 The
credibility gap for prostitutes arises out of a theory that a prosti-
tute could not legally be raped; if a woman has sold her sexuality
for any reason, then she cannot regain it for herself.27 Hence, her
claim to her own sexuality must be unbelievable.
Women are perceived in the legal system as less reliable than
men, even where violence is not explicitly at issue. A recent
study concluded that there are dramatically different interpreta-
tions of the wishes of incompetent patients according to their gen-
der.28 Women's preferences for treatment are often disregarded,
but the same expression by a man would be considered adequate
testimony to his wishes.29
STATE V. HENNUM, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1023, 1033-35 (1990). The battered women syn-
drome describes a cycle of escalating violence in the home, from which the woman,
tied economically, or because of her children to the batterer, only gradually es-
capes.
Judges, lawyers and juries have begun to recognize that there are many com-
pelling reasons why a woman does not leave a batterer at the first sign of abuse,
including financial dependence, risk of retaliation to her and her children, an apol-
ogy by the batterer and the desire to keep the family together.
24. See Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 307
(1985). When a battered woman does speak out, she may minimize the violence
against her because of her awareness that she may be found culpable for an act of
violence against herself.
25. Deana Pollard, Regulating Violent Pornography, 43 VAND. L. REV. 125, 133
(1990). Some of the women are prostitutes who are forced by their pimps to partici-
pate. Id. at 133-34. Many of the women fear retaliation if they do not continue to
perform. Id. at 134.
26. Id. at 134.
27. Catharine A. MacKinnon asserts that pornography itself "strips and devas-
tates women of credibility" whether their claim is sexual assault or sexually offen-
sive language. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister:
Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 163, 193 (1987).
Pornography's objectification of women as sexual objects who only find fulfill-
ment in men undermines the perception of women as complete human beings, ca-
pable of considerate and clear decision-making.
28. Miles & August, supra note 13.
29. Id. at 87-89. When patients expressed their preferences for continuing
[Vol. 10:285
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These examples reveal a bias in the law that men's judgments
and decisions are more deserving of legal protection than women's.
This bias perpetuates a distorted view of women and results in
their being afforded unequal protection of the law. In cases of sex-
ual harassment, women plaintiffs have encountered the same pre-
sumptions of poor credibility that have stifled women who have
sought other types of legal protection.30 In her article, Sex at
Work, Susan Estrich concludes that sexual harassment case law
reveals that "these are not cases of people judging other people.
They are cases of men judging women on the topic of sex. And on
that topic, women, because they are women, bear an enormous
burden of proof."31 She adds that in order "to meet these burdens,
one must first be believed-no easy task when the rules of credi-
bility are stacked against women."3 2
This persistent discrediting of women's words and exper-
iences seems particularly ironic in the area of sexual harassment
law, which is rooted in the recognition of discrimination against
women. According to Catharine MacKinnon, discrimination law is
built upon an awareness of fundamental inequalities in our society,
that "Women's place at work and in sexual relations ... [is] sepa-
rate and subordinate and not equal."3 3 She challenges the reluc-
tance to enforce sexual harassment law: "If sexual harassment
expresses the pervasive reality of normal relations between the
sexes, and if these relations express unequal social power, then the
feelings and practices that emerge are not reasons that the prac-
tices should be allowed." 34 Yet, the law has only recently begun to
treatment or not, in the event they became incompetent, men's wishes were re-
garded as "rational" and displaying "passionate conviction" while women's were
"unreflective, emotional or immature." Id. Only women were referred to in child-
like terms, described as in the "fetal" position, or an "infantile state," and requiring
the state to act as parens patriae. Id.
The cases consistently portrayed men as "subject to medical assault" while wo-
men were seen as "vulnerable to medical neglect." Id. at 89. When evidence of the
wishes of women patients was brought to court, the women had to meet a clear and
convincing standard, while men's statements were not held to a heightened stan-
dard. Ad
30. See Susan R. Klein, Comment, A Survey of Evidence and Discovery Rules
in Civil Sexual Harassment Suits with Special Emphasis on California Law, 11 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 540, 542-43, n.9 (citing Sexual Harassment in the Federal Govern-
ment; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 28 (1979)). "Women who do file
sexual harassment complaints are treated as rape victims traditionally have been
treated; their word is doubted and they are charged with immoral behavior."
31. Estrich, supra note 5, at 853.
32. Id.





address these fundamental issues of discrimination and to afford
women who tell their stories of discrimination a hearing in which
they are treated as credible witnesses.
II. Challenges to Women's Credibility in Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Law
A. History
The continued credibility problems facing women sexual har-
assment complainants may be rooted in Congress' initial lack of
commitment to the issue. The inclusion of gender discrimination
in the workplace in the Civil Rights Act of 1964w5 is said to have
been a political attempt to prevent the law's passage. 36 Yet, de-
spite the belief by some that women objecting to workplace dis-
crimination was ludicrous, the bill became law.37
However, the creation of a cause of action for sexual harass-
ment did not follow immediately. In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon
published the influential book, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women, in which she explored women's experiences of sexual
harassment, the inequities that engendered such experiences, and
responses to sexual harassment.38 The following year the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines
which explicitly stated that harassment on the basis of sex was a
violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.39
As MacKinnon had done, the EEOC guidelines distinguished
two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment.4 0 Quid pro quo harassment consists of unwelcome sexual
advances, the acceptance or rejection of which impacts employ-
ment decisions.4 ' Hostile environment sexual harassment exists
when sexual conduct "unreasonably interfer[es] with an individ-
ual's work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or of-
fensive working environment."42
Despite the guidelines, courts were reluctant to permit a sex-
ual harassment cause of action. Early attempts to bring suits were
countered with the argument that Congress had not intended a
sexual harassment cause of action.43 Nonetheless, quid pro quo
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
36. Estrich, supra note 5, at 816-17.
37. See id.
38. MACKINNON, supra note 33.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1980). See Estrich, supra note 5, at 813, 818.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1980); MACKINNON, supra note 33 at 32-47.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1-2).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604-11(a)(3) (alteration added).
43. Estrich, supra note 5, at 818.
[Vol. 10:285
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cases gained gradual acceptance. 44 Recognition of the hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment cause of action came only recently,
with the United States Supreme Court's Meritor v. Vinson deci-
sion in 1986.45
B. Women's Credibility in Iostile Environment Actions
Courts have often dismissed women's sexual harassment
claims as idiosyncratic oversensitive responses of women to a nor-
mal workplace situation.48 However, several commentators have
noted that the perception of sexual harassment as normal behavior
is the root of the problem. Catharine MacKinnon stated, "Most
men do not sexually harass women with an intent to injure the fe-
male sex. To act with an intent to subordinate women is to ac-
knowledge the atrocity of the act, when it is precisely that it is
considered totally normal that is its most atrocious feature."47
Some twelve years later, in 1991, Susan Estrich concluded simi-
larly, that:
The problem with the court decisions, and the attitudes they
reflect, is that offensive sexuality is so routinely considered
normal, abuse of power acceptable, and the dehumanizing of
women in sexual relations unremarkable, that when we (or
the courts, at least) see such things at work, it hardly seems a
"federal case."'48
Because of the prevalence of this perspective, Estrich suggests that
Title VII actions respond only to very unusual, egregious sexual
harassment, while "the problem, by and large, is what is consid-
ered usual."49 Meritor v. Vinson, the first hostile environment
sexual harassment case decided by the Supreme Court, illustrates
the law's requirement of particularly extreme circumstances
before a woman's claim of sexual harassment would be recognized.
C. Meritor v. Vinson
Meritor v. Vinson, still the only sexual harassment case de-
cided by the United States Supreme Court, demands that a woman
demonstrate both that the implicated behavior was "sufficiently
severe or pervasive" to create an abusive work environment and
also that she indicated that the sexual advances were unwel-
44. Id. at 818-20.
45. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
46. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
47. MAcKINNON, supra note 33, at 199.




come.5 0 The opinion concedes that "whether particular conduct
was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and
turns largely on credibility determinations." 51 The Court seeks
resolution of this credibility problem through consideration of the
"record as a whole."5 2 The presentation and interpretation of that
record is quite troubling.
The Supreme Court opinion in Merntor v. Vinson, purports to
look at the record as a whole, yet it fails to make any mention of
the fact that Mechelle Vinson was African-American.5 3 The Court
demonstrated no perception of the interplay between racial and
sexual discrimination as directed against women of color, or the
potential impact of that interplay on Vinson's credibility. Yet,
"discrimination against women of color often operates differently,
is fueled by different factors and results in different stereotypes,
than discrimination against either men of color or white wo-
men.'54 The Court's failure to discuss Vinson's race reveals their
perspective that it was not legally significant or even relevant.
One legal commentator suggests that "only white people have
been able to imagine that sexism and racism are separate exper-
iences."5 5 Stereotypical presumptions of African-American women
may well have contributed to the Court's conclusion that Mechelle
Vinson's clothes were legally relevant to the outcome of her case.56




54. Mary E. Becker, Symposium: The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Enploynent- Needed in the Ninetie& Improved Individual and Struc-
tural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 78 GEo. L.J.
1659, 1675-76 (1991). She offers an example of African-American women.
[S]ex has been historically used to subordinate black women; consider
the frequent rape of female slaves by their owners and overseers.
Even after abolition, black women could be raped with impunity, espe-
cially by white men. To this day, black women are seen as "easier"
and more exotic sexual partners than white women. These and other
factors... are likely to affect the treatment of African-American wo-
men in the job market.
She continues, "Similar points could be made about Hispanic women, Asian women
and other women of color. Discrimination operates differently for each of these
groups with respect both to men of their group and women of other groups. Asian
women are, for example, seen as particularly passive." Id.
55. Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 604 (1990), as quoted in Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman, Ob-
scuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons between
Racism and Sexism (or other -isms), 2 DuKE L.J. 397, - n.23 (1991). The authors
comment that "white supremacy makes whiteness to normative model. Being the
norm allows whites to ignore race, except when they perceive race (usually some-
one else's) as intruding upon their lives. Id.
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
[Vol. 10:285
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Determining that some of her clothes were "sexually provocative,"
the Court took on the perspective not of Mechelle Vinson, but of a
voyeur, of one who, in a usually passive way, might be "pro-
voked." 57 Susan Estrich suggests,
The consequences of this approach are devastating for women.
Women are invisible as anything other than potential sexual
objects of men... And in making the determination of harass-
ment of women dependent upon the extent of "sexually pro-
vocative" behavior by women, the Court adopts a rule which
holds women responsible for their own torment. Thus, the
victim of harassment, like the rape victim, suffers not only the
direct injury of sexual abuse, but also the indignity of the
Court's presumption that she is to blame.58
In a case where the fact pattern includes multiple instances of for-
cible rape by Vinson's supervisor, Sidney Taylor, this conclusion of
law seems outrageous. In light of the extreme violence and degra-
dation of the conduct directed towards Mechelle Vinson, it appears
the Court began this case with a presumption that she was to
blame not only for her sex, but also for her race. The decision in
effect set egregious conduct as the standard for an actionable cause
of action.5 9
Due to preconceived notions of women's experiences, and
their status in the workplace, women face challenging barriers to
their perception as credible parties. Their testimony must often be
buttressed by corroborating witnesses, and the truthfulness of
their complaint may be challenged because of its timing.60 One
court dismissed a woman's claim because they perceived her testi-
mony as "illogical."s1 The court reasoned that if the complainant
really had been harassed, she would have spoken up about it. The
decisions in sexual harassment cases reflect stereotypical presump-
tions of women's experiences. Courts tend to attribute complaints
of sexual harassment to the theoretical motivation of the "scorned
woman" or to categorize the woman as a "whore." 62 Cases mini-
mize the woman's experience, "depict[ing] sexual taunts, inquiries
or magazines as a comparatively harmless amusement, or as the
treatment women should expect when they push their way into
the workplace."63 On the whole, courts have perceived women
57. Id.
58. Estrich, supra note 5, at 828-29.
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
60. Estrich, supra note 5, at 848.
61. Id. at 852, (citing Benton v. Kroger, 640 F. Supp. at 1321 (S.D. Tex. 1986)).
62. Id. at 848-49.
63. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1203.
1992]
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complaining of sexual harassment as less than credible by virtue of
their sex.
D. The Advent of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard
While early women complainants were judged according to a
reasonable person standard, Ellison's "reasonable woman" stan-
dard offers a closer approximation of women's experiences of sex-
ual harassment. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,64 the court
was reluctant to find that the complainant was a victim of hostile
environment sexual harassment.6 5 Plaintiff Vivienne Rabidue
complained of obscene language and the display of posters of nude
women in the workplace. 68 The majority used a reasonable person
standard to examine Rabidue's complaint.67 The court recom-
mended a consideration of the working environment as a whole,
"the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded" the workplace and the
"reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering
that environment."6 8 The burden was placed upon the female em-
ployee to adapt to the male-dominated environment where sexual
jokes, conversations and "rough hewn" language prevailed. The
court found that Title VII was not meant to eradicate such an en-
vironment.69 Thus, while purportedly giving fair consideration to
a complaint of sexual harassment, the Rabidue court openly re-
jected the basic principle that disparities between the treatment of
women and men exist in the workplace. The court, in essence, re-
jected the idea that "[d]iscrimination law exists to remedy such
disparities. "70
Circuit Judge Keith dissented, suggesting that in place of a
64. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
65. Id
66. 1d at 615, dissent at 624. Vivienne Rabidue worked as an administrative as-
sistant at Osceola Refining Co. The dissent explains that she filed the hostile envi-
ronment claim on behalf of herself and other female employees "who feared losing
their jobs if they complained directly." The women described a workplace where a
poster was displayed for eight years of a nude woman reclining, with a golf ball on
her breast and a man standing over with a golf club yelling "fore." One co-worker,
Doug Henry, repeatedly spoke of women as "whores," "cunts," "pussy," and "tits,"
and said of Rabidue, "[a]ll that bitch needs is a good lay." (The majority referred
vaguely to these remarks as Henry's "obscene comments about women generally.")
While the majority's dissent described the complained-of behavior in brief,
non-specific terms, they explicitly characterized Rabidue as "capable, independent,
ambitious, aggressive, intractable and opinionated" as well as "abrasive, rude, an-
tagonistic, extremely willful, uncooperative and irascible. . ." Id.
67. Id. at 620.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419,
430).
70. See MACKINNON, supra note 33, at 220.
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reasonable person standard, the court should adopt a "reasonable
woman" standard.71 Justice Keith explained, "In my view, the
reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide diver-
gence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct
and those of men."72 He pointed to the majority's male-oriented
presumption that the status quo was within the law and that a wo-
man should accept it or leave her job.
The "reasonable woman" standard may treat women as too
similar while not emphasizing enough their differences from men.
Barbara Ehrenreich described Judge Keith's dissent as a "futile ef-
fort to overcome the contradiction between diversity and conform-
ity."73 However, a standard that fails to address diversity is not
reasonable. A complainant's race, economic background and other
factors must be considered.74 In 1991, two influential courts intro-
duced the "reasonable woman" standard.75 In Ellison v. Brady,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a "reasonable woman"
standard for hostile environment sexual harassment claims.
III. The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Ellison v. Brady
In Ellison v. Brady, the court examined a claim of hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment from the perspective of a reasonable
woman.76 The three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals held
that a prima facie case of sexual harassment would be found
where a reasonable woman would consider that the alleged con-
duct was severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions
and create a hostile work environment.77 The court found a valid
claim of hostile environment sexual harassment in Kerry Ellison's
complaint against Sterling Gray, an officemate at the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) who had written her a series of suggestive
letters.7 8
A. Ellison's Reasonable Woman: Speaking Out Against
Harassment
The Ellison court noted the inadequacy of the reasonable
71. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
72. Id.
73. Barbara Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men:e The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1216 (1990).
74. Id. at 1218-19.
75. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
76. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
77. Id. (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd
Cir.1990)).
78. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 873.
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person standard because of its incorporation of male-bias and dis-
regard for women's distinctive experiences. 79 In its place, the
court advocated the implementation of a "reasonable woman"
standard, asserting that "a gender-conscious examination of sexual
harassment enables women to participate in the workplace on an
equal footing with men."8 0 The attempted incorporation of the fe-
male victim's perspective provided a dramatic shift from previous
cases which had focused on the alleged harasser's viewpoint.81
While the "reasonable woman" represents an improvement
over prior standards, the attributes of the "reasonable woman" re-
main unclear and may, in fact, threaten the credibility of a broad
range of women with hostile environment claims. As a standard
shaped in a legal context, driven by the need for simple, predict-
able norms that lead to consistent decisions, the "reasonable wo-
man" standard may exclude the varied perspectives of women of
different races, classes, sexual orientations, and abilities. The "rea-
sonable woman" construct may simply be a hollow shell, which
has little to do with real women's lives and experiences. The ab-
sence of female judges from the federal courts deciding sexual har-
assment claims means that decision makers will probably have
little familiarity with a woman's perspective on inequality in the
workplace.8 2 Yet the standard does represent a clear improvement
over the former "reasonable man" standard and the more recent
"reasonable person" standard. The "reasonable woman" standard,
as elaborated in Ellison, does have the potential to improve the
credibility of female complainants of hostile environment sexual
harassment.
The Ellison court's dramatic shift of perspective begins with
their decision to abandon the viewpoint (relied on in prior cases)
of the male harasser and the defense of his conduct as inoffen-
sive. 83 The shift in focus to the victim's experience of the har-
79. Id. at 879.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
82. Merrick T. Rossein, They're for Women, Too, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1992, at 56.
Rossein concludes that "until more women judges are appointed, the female per-
spective is virtually absent from the federal courts." Id.
83. Because I believe that sexual harassment in an employment setting is an ex-
tension of broader societal inequality, I will focus largely on sexual harassment of
women by men. My belief is supported by statistics of sexual harassment claims, 92
percent of which are made by women against men. See Dana Priest, Hill-Thomas
Legacy May Be Challenges to Old Workplace Patterns, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1992,
at A8. I am considering the "reasonable woman" standard as a response to this cat-
egory of harassment. By focusing on harassment of women by men, I do not mean
to diminish the importance of also ridding the workplace of all other classes of sex-
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asser's conduct is crucial to a fair hearing for the woman
complainant. While Title VII never required a showing of invidi-
ous intent, cases prior to Ellison often excused conduct perceived
by the victim as harassment because abusive intent was lacking.8 4
The Ellison standard moves the law away from prior ingrained bi-
ases against women, which permitted this distortion.8 5
Ellison's "reasonable woman" standard goes beyond merely
shifting the court's perspective from the harasser to the victim. El-
lison openly recognizes certain characteristics about the victim and
distinguishes the victim from the harasser. Most notably, the Elli-
son court recognizes that most victims of sexual harassment are
women, and that as women, their experiences of harassment are
fundamentally different from men's.8 6 Indeed, the court relied on
sources which revealed how in situations where women had been
harassed, men had not perceived any harassment. Rather, men
viewed the offensive conduct as "harmless social interactions to
which only overly-sensitive women would object."8 7
In Kerry Ellison's case, the IRS conceded that Gray's behav-
ior constituted sexual harassment, yet they argued that his actions
were not severe or pervasive enough to merit protection under Ti-
tle VII.88 The IRS pointed to prior cases in which more compel-
ling facts were held to have not "seriously affect[ed] the plaintiff's
psychological well-being" and thus were not seen as actionable
sexual harassment.8 9 Yet, the Ellison three-judge panel chose to
disregard those prior decisions.
The court held that harassment was actionable when the vic-
tim perceived the harasser's conduct as severe.90 If the effect on
the victim is sufficiently severe, the harasser cannot exculpate
himself by insisting that he was without harmful intent.91 The
court gave greater weight to Kerry Ellison's experience and its of-
ual harassment, whether directed against someone of the same sex or by women
against men. Sexual harassment of all kinds is inappropriate, disruptive, dis-
turbing, and offensive.
84. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
85. See, e.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611.
86. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-81.
87. Id. at 879 (quoting Ehrenreich, supra note 73, at 1207-08).
88. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876.
89. Id. at 877. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.1986),
cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 212
(7th Cir. 1986).
90. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. Judge Beezer elaborates, pointing to the ludicrous
outcome of a Title VII policy which in defense of victims of sexual harassment, re-
quired proof of their complete psychiatric collapse due to the harassment, before
any relief could be granted.
91. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. Judge Beezer further explains, "the reasonable vic-
tim standard we adopt today classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even
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fensiveness to her than to the relative inoffensiveness of the con-
duct as perceived by the IRS. In so doing, the court openly
rejected Rabidue and other cases which had focused on the har-
asser's point of view.92
The court acknowledged that the use of a "sex-blind reason-
able person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to system-
atically ignore the experiences of women."9 3 The "reasonable
woman" standard is purported to facilitate equal participation of
men and women in the workplace. The Ellison court demon-
strated that the "reasonable woman" standard offered equitable
means for measuring sexual harassment by contrasting the results*
under it with those under the prior "reasonable man" standard.94
The court concluded that the reasonable woman would con-
sider the behavior of Ellison's co-employee, Gray, as harassment,
whereas a reasonable man might think that Gray was a harmless,
modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac who had not engaged in harass-
ment.95 In order to remedy sexual inequities in the workplace, the
court rejects the "reasonable man's" perspective, and concludes
that Gray's behavior was sexual harassment.
The strength of Ellison's "reasonable woman" standard is in
the verbal recognition of the gulf between men's and women's ex-
periences, however these experiences are interpreted. The mere
use of a new term, where another has existed unchallenged for an
extended period of time, highlights the substantial differences be-
tween experiences and the need for separate standards to recog-
nize these differences. The weaknesses of the "reasonable
woman" standard, however, are the lack of explication as to who
the "reasonable woman" is and what "reasonable" means. The
vagueness of the standard could lead to varied interpretations by
causing some courts to look to women's experiences for a fuller
definition, while others continue to rely on traditional, male-ori-
ented standards in the guise of a new name. The Ellison decision
draws together some elements of each of these approaches.
Ellison concludes that while not all women think alike, there
are nonetheless many women who share certain concerns which
are not shared by men.96 As an example of one of these distinctive
experiences of women, Ellison suggests a woman's fear of violence
when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working environ-
ment." I& at 880.
92. M
93. Id. at 879.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 878-80. See also, Ehrenreich, supra note 73; Abrams, supra note 63.
96. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
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from men, specifically sexual assault, and how this fear shapes her
response to sexual harassment.9 7 Since men rarely experience
sexual assault, their perception of the risk of sexual harassment
escalating into sexual assault is quite low. By thus introducing and
defining the "reasonable woman" standard, Ellison began to sup-
ply plaintiffs with the solid argument of the credible, reasonable
woman to respond to defenses of sexual harassment based on the
harasser's perspective.
B. The "Reasonable Woman" as Limited Construct of Her
Creators
1. Reasonableness: Can a Neutral Standard Answer a
Fundamental Inequality?
The court cloaked Kerry Ellison in the mantle of the "rea-
sonable woman" and thereby endowed her with greater credibility.
Yet the vagueness of the "reasonable woman" construct, as it was
used in Ellison's case, could limit a woman complainant's potential
for bringing a successful sexual harassment suit. Ellison held that
"a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment
sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the employment and create an abusive working
environment." 98
While the court concludes that Kerry Ellison acted as a rea-
sonable woman would have, given a similar situation, the identity
of the "reasonable woman" remains obscure. Throughout the
opinion, the majority seems to presume that what makes a woman
employee reasonable requires no further comment. The court con-
trasts the attitude of a "reasonable woman" with the "idiosyncratic
concerns of a rare hyper-sensitive employee." 99 The court also re-
fers to the "effects of the sexual harassment on reasonable wo-
men," rather than on "women."100
By failing to define the limits of the "reasonable woman"
construct, the court has left a void into which the particular facts
of Kerry Ellison's case fit. Since the court holds that she is a "rea-
sonable woman," for other women's actions and attitudes to be
reasonable, they should follow the pattern set by Ellison. The risk
is that in failing to meet this oblique "reasonable woman" norm, a
complainant may be dismissed as "idiosyncratic or hyper-sensi-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 879.
99. Id
100. Md (emphasis added).
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tive."10l The court fails to clarify the meaning of either "idiosyn-
cratic" or "hyper-sensitive," perhaps presuming the terms speak
for themselves. This failure is somewhat disingenuous, given the
fact that reasonableness standards are legal fictions, and the court
is introducing a new standard.
Why then does the court fail to clarify what makes one wo-
man reasonable and the other hyper-sensitive? The court appears
to have entered a difficult area, where to admit to the need for a
radically new standard which truly responds to societal inequities
will place the court in conflict with its own principle of equitable
treatment of all parties. While the "reasonable woman" standard
reflects "the value of a jurisprudence that directly addresses the
intergroup conflicts raised by legal cases," its vagueness "illus-
trates the tenacity of the idea that courts should not engage in ex-
plicitly political decision-making."102 To explicitly recognize
inequality while treating all fairly, as the Ellison court claims to
do, may prove unworkable. The adoption of any neutral standard
engenders a risk of merely echoing the values of a legal system
which has long favored white men. "Blacks and women are the
objects of a constitutional omission that has been incorporated into
a theory of neutrality."1 03
Ehrenreich suggests that judges who had done so prior to El-
lison had mistakenly concluded that "a reasonableness test could
assure fair results to all."'1 4 She urges legal decision-makers to es-
chew purported neutrality in favor of fair results to all.105 When
legal decisions employ constructs that pretend to respond to socie-
tal inequities, "the major risk is that . . . the constructs will con-
tinue to hide power relationships and thereby legitimate a
fundamentally unequal system." 0 6 By failing to recognize its own
bias, the Ellison majority risks overstating the import of the stan-
dard which they have created, and its potential as a vehicle for
true change.
2. Kerry Ellison as a "Reasonable Woman"
The Ellison court described in detail the initial harassing be-
101. IAL
102. Ehrenreich, supra note 73, at 1215.
103. PATRICIA J. WiLLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 121 (1991). Wil-
liams states that "the real issue is precisely the canonized status of any one group's
control. Black individuality is subsumed in a social circumstance-an idea, a stereo-
type that pins us to the underside of this society and keeps us there, out of sight,
out of mind, out of the knowledge of the mind which is law." Id.
104. Id at 1225.
105. Id
106. Id. at 1231.
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havior and Ellison's efforts to halt it. Kerry Ellison had docu-
mented the harassment with written testimony, had persisted in
her complaint, and had gone to a supervisor who believed her, re-
sponded positively, and later served as a corroborating witness.
The Ellison decision might serve to discount the testimony of an-
other woman who experiences equally egregious harassment but
does not amass evidence similar to Ellison's because her response
was less than "reasonable."107 Such a woman, of course, would be
no less reasonable for choosing not to report the harassment to a
superior, particularly a male superior.' 08 Many women would con-
sider not reporting an incident or series of events as the more rea-
sonable option, in order to protect against personal and
employment related retribution.109
The court indicated that understanding the victim's view re-
quires, "among other things, an analysis of the different perspec-
tives of men and women."110 Yet the court's analysis of these
differences is cursory. The court offers some examples to demon-
strate the principle that "[c]onduct that many men consider unob-
jectionable may offend many women.""' These examples,
however, reveal more about a man's perspective of sexual harass-
ment than a woman's.
The court cites a hypothetical situation used in a previous
case to compare the perspectives of a male supervisor with a fe-
male employee regarding the supervisor's comments on the female
employee's body or legs.112 The supervisor might consider the
107. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876-81.
108. Cf. Bray, supra note 1.
It was, after all, the Senate's appalling lack of familiarity with what it
feels like to be powerless, vulnerable and afraid that rendered Anita
Hill and her behavior incomprehensible to most of them.... Hill
showed no signs of the Harriet Tubman Syndrome, the fierce insis-
tence on freedom or death that made Tubman an abolitionist legend.
Anita Hill grabbed no blunt objects with which to threaten her supe-
rior, she did not thunder into his office in righteous anger or invoke
the power to bring suit. She was not funny, or feisty, or furious in re-
sponse to the behavior she described. She was disgusted, embarrassed
and ambivalent. Therefore, it must have been a dream.
kCL
109. Id. Carol Gilligan remarked of Anita Hill,
It amazed me that no one understood the underlying logic of what she
did... Her basic assumption was that you live in connection with
others, in relationship with others. Now, her experience of that rela-
tionship was one of violation; it was offensive to her. But she was
making the attempt to work it through the relationship; trying to re-
solve conflict without breaking connection.
110. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d at 878.
111. Id.




comments "legitimate" while the employee might regard them as
"offensive."113 The court recognized that men and women are of-
fended by different things. The court's examples, however, fo-
cused on the male perspective of harassment, interpreting it as
"harmless amusement" or conduct to which "only overly sensitive
women would object." 114 Rather than clarify women's perspec-
tives and why their experiences are fundamentally different from
men's, these examples simply classify women's perspectives as the
"other" and recount familiar male interpretations of the events.
The explanation for the existence of concerns which are unique to
women is perfunctory. The court's only attempt to explain why
women find sexual harassment offensive when men do not is the
court's recognition of women's "disproportionate" victimization by
rape and sexual assault.115
This emphasis on the threat of violence as a legitimate cause
of a woman's perception of harassment could lead to a higher stan-
dard of proof for women victims. For example, women may be re-
quired to demonstrate that they "reasonably" feared for their
safety as a result of the behavior, rather than that the behavior of-
fended them. While some women who are being harassed un-
doubtedly do fear the escalation of harassment into physical abuse,
this fear is not a crucial or sole element in what makes sexual har-
assment offensive to women. Anita Hill commented, "We are an-
gry because this awful thing called harassment exists in terribly
harsh, ugly, demeaning, and even debilitating ways .... It is a
form of .. . economic coercion."1l 6 Women who have been sexu-
ally harassed feel "humiliated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed,
and cheap, as well as angry.""17 Catharine MacKinnon concludes,
"sexual harassment makes of women's sexuality a badge of female
servitude."118
Rather than fully consider women's experiences of sexual
harassment, the Ellison court relied on its judicial sense of fairness
and the resulting need to protect employers. It, therefore, created
113. Id. The court offered no explanation as to why the conduct might be offen-
sive only to the employee.
114. Id. at 878-79, citing Ehrenreich, supra note 73, at 1207-08; Abrams, supra
note 63, at 1203.
115. Id.; see Rivers, supra note 10 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR 1988 16 (1989)). The FBI report estimated that 73 of
every 100,000 females in the country were reported rape victims. If the figure is
correct however, it is certainly far below the number of victims of rape, who often
choose not to report the offense.
116. Anita Hill, The Nature of the Beast, Ms., Jan./Feb. 1992, at 32-33.
117. MAcKNNON, supra note 33, at 47.
118. Id at 177.
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an incomplete and, in many senses, incorrect standard of behavior
for allegedly reasonable women.
3. What Conduct Constitutes Sexual Harassment
Ellison offers little guidance on the limits of behavior which
will qualify as sexual harassment. While an "isolated epithet"
could not be the basis for an actionable claim, the court found that
Title VII protection begins before the victim of sexual harassment
requires psychiatric care, or (as in Vinson) before there is a forci-
ble rape.11 9 The court placed Ellison's co-worker's conduct be-
tween these extremes. The usefulness of these limits is uncertain
however, since the range of behavior between them is so broad.
The court allows that "well intentioned compliments by co-work-
ers or supervisors" could be used to support a sexual harassment
claim only if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff
would consider the comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter a condition of employment and create an abusive working
environment.
Once again, the vagueness of the reasonableness standard
prevents clarification of actual behavioral limits. The court's reli-
ance on the reasonableness standard and concurrent reluctance to
address the fundamental inequities faced by women in the work-
place contributes to a muddled standard. The Ellison opinion
reveals the divided loyalties of a court professing allegiance to both
fairness and the recognition of inequality.
Rather than elaborate on the impact of sexual harassment on
women, the court focused on the dangers to employers posed by
sexual harassment claims. The court introduced the holding of the
case with an explanation that it had come to the decision "[iun or-
der to shield employers from having to accommodate the idiosyn-
cratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee...."1 20 Rather
than legitimize female victims' complaints of harassment, this ex-
planation presumes that employers are at risk from women who,
in their idiosyncracy and hyper-sensitivity, will victimize them.
The "reasonable woman" standard is merely a tool for employers
to distinguish between frivolous and legitimate complaints.
4. The "Reasonable Woman" Standard is Symbolically
Useful but Practically Limited
The adoption of the "reasonable woman" standard in Ellison
119. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d at 877-78.
120. Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
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represents an important movement away from prior law which
protected the workplace status quo. The court states in very clear
terms, "Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist
prejudices."121 The case represents a definite shift from earlier
cases which were reluctant to recognize anything but repeated sex-
ual demands as sexual harassment.122 The recognition that wo-
men victims' perspectives must shape the finding of hostile
environment sexual harassment also represents a broad-based
change in the law, with possible repercussions beyond the legal
realm. Ehrenreich suggests,
The primary benefit of retaining a problematic concept like
reasonableness ... is that [its] immense symbolic power can
serve to legitimate the demands for social transformation that
[it] is used to articulate, while [its] very vagueness and ab-
stractness can allow [it] to serve as [a] valuable vehicle for
generating dialogue on national values. 123
The court, however, concludes too quickly that it has solved
the problems of hostile environment sexual harassment law.
Looking to the future, the court exclaims, "[w]e hope that over
time both men and women will learn what conduct offends reason-
able members of the other sex. When employers and employees
internalize the standard of workplace conduct we establish today,
the current gap in perception between the sexes will be
bridged."124 The court further asserts, "a gender conscious exami-
nation of sexual harassment enables women to participate in the
workplace on an equal footing with men."125 The court's presump-
tion of the immediate resolution of an intractable, systemic prob-
lem by their mere "examination" or the adoption of their less-
than-lucid standard reveals its failure to truly understand the dy-
namic of inequality which creates and perpetuates sexual harass-
ment. Furthermore, the court has not overcome the inconsistency
of pursuing the eradication of unfairness to all parties. While pur-
porting to adopt a woman's perspective, the majority has in fact
imposed a standard that relies on fairly traditional legal notions of
reasonable behavior. The court does not explore Kerry Ellison's
life and experiences. As with prior reasonableness standards, this
standard "ignores the social reality of the individual."126
A standard that more closely approximates a woman's experi-
ence should fully consider several factors impacting the woman's
121. Id. at 881.
122. Abrams, supra note 63, at 1199.
123. Ehrenreich, supra note 73, at 1230.
124. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d at 881.
125. Id. at 879.
126. Ehrenreich, supra note 73, at 1218.
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life and work. Among other factors, courts should consider the
woman's race, her class, her sexual orientation, any disabilities she
might have, and her financial well-being. In Ellison, for example,
the court fails to consider the plaintiff's financial status and
whether she has savings to fall back on if she were to lose her job.
Nor does the court consider her educational level, and the ease
with which she might find other work. For a plaintiff who is a wo-
man of color, the court should consider the powerful intermingling
of prejudice on the basis of race and sex and the potential for
mixed loyalties to each. A finding of an abusive environment may
vary according to several factors and overlaps may exist.
IV. The Use of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Robinson
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards 127, a case decided con-
currently with Ellison in the United States Middle District Court
in Florida, Lois Robinson won a suit for hostile environment sex-
ual harassment against the shipyard where she worked as a
welder.128 The opinion included long, detailed facts which high-
lighted persistent harassment at the shipyard over several years.
While the court perceived Robinson as a credible witness, it did so
somewhat reluctantly, guided especially by expert testimony.
The Robinson court emphasized the witness's testimony as
"credible." However, it is not clear whether Robinson's testimony
would have been perceived as credible if she had lacked cor-
roborating witnesses or if the harassment against her had not been
so egregious.' 29 Calling her emotional demeanor at trial a "limita-
tion," along with the fact that Robinson tried to ignore some of the
harassment, the court concluded that "these limitations... do not
diminish the weight and the usefulness of the testimony."'130 Lois
Robinson's credibility was enhanced by the testimony of expert
witnesses, who described typical reactions by women suffering sex-
ual harassment and the phenomenon of sexual stereotyping.131
The court devoted fully half of its opinion to a recitation of the vo-
luminous, carefully documented incidents of offensive conduct,
speech and display of offensive materials to which Robinson was
subjected. The Robinson court thus found that the behavior of the
shipyard workers directed at Lois Robinson created a hostile, abu-
127. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1495. ("The individual episodes illustrate and lend credibility to the
broader assertions of pervasiveness.").
130. Id.




The egregious harassment directed at Lois Robinson suggests
that the Florida court might also demand a very high evidentiary
standard from future plaintiffs. Those unable to demonstrate a
level of harassment comparable to that experienced by Robinson
could risk being dismissed as less than reasonable women, along
the "idiosyncratic," "hypersensitive" line of Ellison. The inclusion
of expert testimony might counter this risk, helping to explain
typical reactions to harassment, such as withdrawal. Yet, in many
cases, women experiencing more subtle forms of harassment might
be precluded from successfully bringing suit.
V. The Civil Rights Law of 1991
Recent changes to the Civil Rights Act may also affect wo-
men's chances in filing hostile environment sexual harassment
claims. The new law will affect sexual discrimination law in three
areas: the availability of jury trials, the inclusion of expert witness
fees as part of attorney's fees, and the potential to obtain compen-
satory and punitive damages.'33 A plaintiff could receive a maxi-
mum of $300,000 in punitive damages (although the jury would not
be informed of the limit).134 Taken together, these changes make
the pursuit of a sexual harassment suit far more attractive than
under the prior law.
VI. Conclusion
Since Anita Hill's testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in October of 1991, hostile environment sexual harass-
ment law has entered the American consciousness. Not only a
topic of casual conversation, employee training and orientations
are now addressing the issue with growing candor.135 These dis-
cussions may well contribute to the new understanding between
men and women in the workplace to which the Ellison court
aspired.
The consideration of sexual harassment in the legal setting
has also become more pressing. Despite fears that the Judiciary
Committee's harsh treatment of Hill would have a chilling effect
on sexual harassment claims, the EEOC reported that the number
132. Id. at 1522-27.
133. THE BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1991-
ANALYSIS S-3
134. Id.
135. Dana Priest, Hill-Thomas Legacy May be Challenges to Old Workplace Pat-
terns, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1992, at A8.
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of complaints in the three months following Hill's testimony was
nearly double that of the same period the year before 36
Ellison's "reasonable woman" standard functions as a correc-
tive to women's credibility problems in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases. The court's recognition of women's experience
as different from that of the prior "reasonable person's" permit a
far broader range of actionable sexual harassment claims. What
was formerly considered harmless, idiosyncratic behavior, is being
recognized with greater frequency as harassment of a reasonable
woman. With this change, the believability of the women them-
selves is improving. The myth of a woman's oversensitive reaction
to male's innocuous behavior still exists, but its scope is drastically
diminished. Continued educational efforts in the workplace, and
more broadly, in society, should result in continued clarification of
what is sexual harassment. The standard should evolve over time,
incorporating more elements of women's actual experience and si-
multaneously debunking the myths about women that have in-
formed courts in the past. The attempted transformations of
women's complaints into stereotyped roles, which do not permit
them a sexual harassment claim, such as what happened to Anita
Hill before the Senate Judiciary Committee and the press, should
be firmly challenged by the "reasonable woman" standard.
While the standard may answer a need to clarify the unequal
experiences of women and men in the workplace, and the distinc-
tiveness of women's perspectives of men's harassment, it suffers
from some troubling weaknesses. Courts must examine whether
or not they can continue the fiction of remaining neutral while
they favor a disadvantaged party. Similarly, the notion of "reason-
ableness" itself should be defined. To argue that a woman is rea-
sonable without elaboration provides an inadequate guide for
future decisions. Future cases should explore the question of
whether the full range of women's behavior includes only the two
possibilities of hypersensitivity or reasonableness, or if women ex-
perience a far broader range of emotion and character. Judges
who consider the breadth of women's experiences, and how each is
distinct from the other due to her race, class, level of disability, ed-
ucation, sexual orientation, and other factors, while also recogniz-
ing similarities among women, will be the most capable decision
makers in cases of hostile environment sexual harassment.
136. Id. (there were 1,244 complaints to 728 the year before).
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